By Estanislao Albano, Jr.
I was able to talk to Engr. Christopher Morales of the National Project Coordinating Office of the PRDP, one of the key personnel in the construction component of the project. When I posed the question on how long PRDP roads are supposed to last, the question which PRDP task force team leader Frauke Jungbluth failed to answer during the press conference on the first day of the mission, he said that the roads under the project are designed to last for 20 years. He then proceeded to tell me how they make sure that their roads will last that long.
Morales said that the to ensure quality and durability, the WB and the DA decided to employ the Infrastructure Quality Management Durability System in the prosecution of the project. He explained there are five components of the system. First, there should be minimum staffing for a contractor to run the project properly. For instance, the PRDP requires materials engineers while government agencies only require foremen. Time and again, NIA engineers involved in the project including Kalinga Irrigation Management Officer Benito Espique said that one of the two main reasons for the failure of the contractor to perform well is its lack of manpower.
Second, there is a contract review process in place. The procedures for validation starting from the preparation of the feasibility study and engineering design review and appraisal are followed strictly. He said that they also followed the procurement procedures adopted by the WB and harmonized with RA 9184. And herein lies the most crucial difference between the PRDP and the PIDP. Morales said that the PRDP followed the provision of RA 9184 on slippage which is as follows: 5 percent – warning and must come up with catch up plan; 10 percent – warning and must come up with and implement a catch up plan; and 15 percent – termination procedures commence. Had this been followed in the case of the rehabilitation of the UCRIS, Markbilt Construction/RD Policarpio and Co. Inc. would not have been able to wreak havoc on the farmers of the UCRIS as it would have been kicked out as early as the first part of 2014 when its slippage had already breached 15 percent. At the time the disaster took place during typhoon Ineng in August 2015, the slippage of the rogue contractor stood at 57 percent, something that is bizarre and unthinkable in the PRDP.
When I told him of the answer of one of the members of the WB mission who came in January this year that the funding agency does not have any policy on slippage and that what is important is that the water will eventually flow into the ricefields, Morales commented that it is but logical for the project to defer to the guidelines of the borrower country. I still have to make a conclusive verification on the pronouncement of that WB representative but the conversation with Morales tells me that at the very least, not all government agencies implementing WB-funded projects shoot themselves in the foot by allowing their contractors to do what they please.
The third component of the quality assurance regulations of the PRDP is strict inspection and testing procedures which Morales said that basically, it follows the Department of Public Works and Highways processes. He mentioned procedures such as field density tests, concrete beam sampling, proper grading of aggregates and concrete design mix. He said that with all the measures undertaken, the chance of not following the right mixture is nil in PRDP projects. I do not know if there ever was an attempt to implement a semblance of this component of quality assurance in the UCRIS rehabilitation project and the repair work it begot. What stands out in my mind is the P100M repair work that leaked and caused a lot of damage to farmers only five months after completion and likewise, the retention wall that fell on its own weight and got broken like biscuits in the process. I have seen very week hollow blocks but that concrete which was supposed to have been done through pouring beat them all. Where were the inspection and testing procedures of the NIA and PIDP in those instances?
The fourth is proper documentation and control processes and the fifth is proper operation and maintenance after the construction both of which I think are not that relevant when we speak of the mess the UCRIS project has become in the hands of the NIA.
From what I have already seen and learned, there is a serious intention on the part of the people involved in the PRDP for the projects to serve their purpose while in the case of the PIDP, no set of measures to ensure that the PIDP projects be done properly and on schedule have been put in place by the agencies involved in the project most specially the NIA which would own and operate the facilities. I use the plural because aside from the UCRIS, several other PIDP undertakings were badly delayed.**
