By Estanislao Albano, Jr.
Relative to the published story that the World Bank is releasing $170M for rural projects in the country stating that the amount will go to the Philippine Rural Development Project (PRDP) being implemented by the Department of Agriculture (DA), let me point out that the implementation of PRDP projects in Kalinga which happens to be the biggest beneficiary of the program among Cordillera provinces remains clear of any controversy. That’s as far as I am informed though.
In contrast, the Participatory Irrigation Development Project (PIDP), also a World Bank (WB)-funded project this time under the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), has made the province the scene of what could be one of the most bizarre occurrences in development project implementation in the world. The inept and negligent implementation of the P425M-worth rehabilitation of the Upper Chico River Irrigation System (UCRIS) resulted in the inability of UCRIS farmers to plant in the second rice cropping of 2015 which cost them some P1B in unrealized harvest. The NIA also spent P100M to repair the damage which caused the lost cropping. So we have here a project which inflicted damages on the beneficiaries worth around thrice its funding considering that the project was only 54 percent done when the contract with contractor Markbilt Construction/RD Policarpio and Co. Inc (Markbilt) was terminated February 2017.
This was a disaster waiting to happen because the manner with which the PIDP WB task force and the NIA implemented the project was the direct opposite of the way the PRDP is being carried out. Please consider the following differences:
First, the WB missions to check on the PRDP are open to public officials and the media. In contrast, the WB missions to monitor the UCRIS project were covert. They were just affairs among the WB team, the local NIA people and officers of the Upper Chico River Irrigation System Federation of Irrigators’ Associations (UCRISFIA). No LGU officials, no media invited by the NIA.
Second, inspections of PRDP projects are open to everyone who is interested to witness and even participate. By contrast, inspections conducted by the WB and NIA officials on the UCRIS were top secret. For example, two officers of the UCRISFIA have informed me they were not notified and invited to witness the evaluation of the accomplishment of Markbilt on the lateral canals and were only told when the evaluation was already done.
Third, PRDP does not allow pouring of concrete unless the engineers of the WB, the DA and the provincial government are all present. On the other hand, there was practically a total breakdown of supervision in the UCRIS rehabilitation project. During the WB and NIA meeting with the UCRISFIA on January 29, 2016, the UCRISFIA officers had asked that in the event the project is extended and Markbilt is retained, the NIA central office should do the monitoring because the people of the contractor do not listen the Kalinga Irrigation Management Office and local PIDP engineers claiming they only follow instruction from the NIA central office. In answer, Engr. Eleuterio Luz, head of the Project Management Office of the PIDP, had said that his department lacks the manpower to regularly monitor the UCRIS project.
Fourth, PIDP has no policy on negative slippage. At least that was the claim of Jeep Stoedjesdijk, WB lead irrigation specialist, during the January 29, 2016 meeting. According to him, the procurement policies and guidelines of the bank says nothing about negative slippage and that what is important is to eventually get the water flowing into the rice fields.
On the other hand, PRDP follows the provision of RA 9184 otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act on slippage which is as follows: 5 percent – warning and must come up with catch up plan; 10 percent – warning and must come up with and implement a catch up plan; and 15 percent – termination procedures commences. Had the PIDP adopted this regulation, the unprecedented disaster which struck UCRIS farmers would have been averted as Markbilt would have been kicked out as early as the first part of 2014 when its slippage had already gone beyond 15 percent. At the time the disaster took place during typhoon Ineng in August 2015, the slippage of the rogue contractor stood at 57 percent.
The application of the government policy on slippage is part of the second component of Infrastructure Quality Management Durability System (IQMDS) adopted and being strictly applied by the PRDP to ensure quality and durability of projects.
The first component of the PRDP IQMDS is the minimum number of manpower for the contractor to run the project properly. Time and again, NIA engineers involved in the project including Kalinga Irrigation Management Officer Benito Espique had said that one of the two main reasons for the failure of the contractor to perform was its lack of manpower.
The third component of the IQMDS of the PRDP is strict inspection and testing procedures which basically follows the Department of Public Works and Highways processes. I do not know if there ever was an attempt to implement a semblance of this component of quality assurance in the UCRIS rehabilitation project. What I have seen is that a sizable length of the concrete layer constructed by Markbilt on the diversion dam was stripped away when the river swelled not long after the construction.
Maria Theresa Quinones, PIDP Philippine task team leader, practically admitted the anything goes nature of PIDP implementation during the January 29, 2016 meeting when she said that her team views the problems being encountered in the UCRIS project like the disagreements between spouses which should not lead to divorce as each party should instead exert efforts to save the marriage. At that time, the slippage had breached 60 percent but still the purpose of her team’s visit to Kalinga was to convince the farmers to allow Markbilt to continue with the project.
The PIDP task force had its hands full trying to save marriages on the rocks at the time because they had other seven slippage-plagued irrigations projects with the slippage of one allegedly breaching 70 percent. I am not aware of what happened to the others but like I said earlier, the UCRIS project was only 54 percent done when the deal with Markbilt was finally ended last February after two extensions.
The big question is how come the WB allows the NIA and PIDP to let the chances of farmers for better irrigation facilities go down the drain when the DA appears to be implementing the PRDP successfully. Does WB headquarters know what’s happening to its projects in the country? Does it care if the money it lends to the country are used properly?**
